Abstract-A proxy re-signature scheme is one which allows a semi-trusted proxy to transform a signer A's signature on a message m, into a signature of signer B on the same message. The proxy is however not allowed to sign arbitrary messages on behalf of either signer. Several proxy re-signature schemes have been proposed, including one ID-based scheme, by Hu et al. In this paper, we describe the flaw in this scheme, with respect to the definitions of delegator and delegate security defined by Ateniese et al. We define a novel and secure IDBased proxy re-signature scheme, which satisfies these security definitions. In addition, we explore the applications of such a signature in inter-domain security. . A modified version of this signature, which can be used to transform signatures between signers in different ID-Based domains, is detailed.
INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Blaze et al. [2] first introduced the primitive of Proxy re-signatures at Eurocrypt '98 and defined. In a proxy re-signature scheme, a semi-trusted proxy acts as a translator between two users, Alice and Bob, to transform a signature from Alice (the delegatee) into a signature from Bob(the delegator), on the same message. There followed a period where this primitive was largely ignored, until Ateniese et al [3] reopened the discussion in 2005, with new security definitions, a formal model and two new algorithms and proved their security in the random oracle model. More recently, in 2007, Shao et al [4] proposed the first scheme that claimed to be secure in the standard model. However, in 2008, S.Chow et al [6] , performed a cryptanalysis of the scheme by Shao and proposed a new proxy re-signature scheme secure in the standard model, based on homomorphic signatures. The first ID-based version of this signature was proposed by Hu et al. [5] and is claimed to be secure in the standard model. Proxy re-signatures can be classified as unidirectional or bidirectional signatures. In a unidirectional proxy re-signature, the re-signature key allows the proxy to convert Alice's signature to Bob's, but not Bob's to Alice's. This property is useful in applications where the trust relationship between the two parties is not mutual. Schemes that do not satisfy this property are bidirectional signatures.
A Proxy re-signature must satisfy the following internal security claims, as discussed in [3] :
Limited Proxy: If the delegator and delegatee are both honest, then the proxy (1) cannot produce signatures for the delegator on any message other than the ones previously signed by the delegate and (2) cannot produce any signatures for the delegatee.
Delegatee Security: If the delegatee is honest, then he is safe from a colluding delegator and proxy. That is, even if the delegator and the proxy work together, they will not be able to forge the delegatee's signature.
Delegator Security: If the delegator is honest, then he is safe from a colluding delegatee and proxy. That is, even if the delegatee and the proxy work together, they will not be able to forge the delegator's signature on a new message.
A. Applications
There are several possible applications for proxy resignatures, as have been listed in the existing literature. One possible application is to introduce anonymity. Individual signatures can be transformed to group signatures, by using the key of the group manager, or a common group key. The advantage here is that the proxy does not know either of the keys, and thus the group manager's key remains private even if the proxy is compromised. They also aid in the usage of machine readable travel documents like e-passports. At each point of travel, the signature within the passport can be transformed through different checkpoints, so that only one transformable signature needs to be held at a time. Another unique application of this signature is in inter-domain security. There are many cases, when a signature in one domain needs to be transformed into a signature by a party in another domain. This can happen in cases such as, mergers and takeovers of companies, and during crosscertification checks. In these cases, the delegator and delegate are not within the same domain, and the proxy is responsible for transforming the signature and rendering it readable in the delegatee's domain. Modifying the signature to achieve inter-domain operability has been illustrated later in the paper.
B. Our Contribution
In this paper, we perform a cryptanalysis of Hu et al's scheme and point out the flaws with respect to the definitions of delegator and delegate security. In order to correct this, we propose a new unidirectional signature that passes these definitions, and is computationally more efficient than that of Hu et al [5] . We provide analytical proofs of unforgeabilty with regard to the three different types of adversaries. A modified version of our signature is also described, which can be used to ensure inter-domain security.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Bilinear Pairings
Let <G 1 , +> be a cyclic additive group generated by P, whose order is a large prime q, <G 2 , ·> be a cyclic An Identity Based Proxy Re-Signature Scheme Tulasi Menon multiplicative group of the same order, and let e: G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear pairing with the following properties:
Bilinear: For any Q,R,T Є G 1 , e(Q+R,T)=e(Q,T)·e(R,T) and e(Q,R+T)=e(Q,R)·e(Q,T)
2. Non-degenerate: There exists R, T Є G 1 , such that e(R, T) ≠1 3. Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(R, T) for any R, T Є G 1 .
B.
Hard Problems:
III. FRAMEWORK OF AN ID-BASED PROXY RE-SIGNATURE
A unidirectional-ID-based proxy re-signature scheme consists of six algorithms: Setup, Extract, ReKeyGen, Sign, ReSign and Verify.
Setup: Input a security parameter k, return the public parameters params, and keep the master secret msk to itself.
Extract: Input the public parameters params, an identity ID and the master secret msk, return the private key S ID of ID.
ReKeyGen: Input the public parameters params, two identities ID 1 , ID 2 , and two private keys S ID1 and S ID2 corresponding to the identities ID 1 , ID 2 respectively, return a re-signature key rk ID1→ID2 .
Sign: Input the public parameters params, an identity ID 1 , S ID1 and a message m, output a signature σ.
ReSign:
, where σ is a signature under an identity ID 1 and m is a message, ID 2 is an identity and rk ID1→ID2 is a re-signature key, output a re-signed signature σ* under the identity ID 2 .
Verify: Input a signature σ, check that if σ is a valid signature. If it holds then output 1, otherwise output 0.
IV. ANALYSIS OF HU ET AL.'S SCHEME
A. Review of the Scheme
Below is given the Setup, Extract and ReKeyGen algorithms from Hu et al's scheme. The entire scheme is not provided due to space constraints, but is available in [5] .
Let G 1 and G 2 be cyclic groups having the same prime order p, and e be a cryptographic bilinear map: 
ID1↔ID2 , rk
(B) ID1↔ID2 ) = (h ID2 /h ID1 , r ID2 /r ID1 ).
B. Attack on the Scheme
The above ReKeyGen algorithm violates the Delegator Security and Delegatee Security notions defined in the Introduction. If we take the first case, let us assume that the delegatee (ID 1 ) is honest, and that the proxy and the delegator (ID 2 ) are colluding.
The proxy has the ReKey value rk ID1↔ID2 = (rk (A)
ID1↔ID2 , rk (B)
ID1↔ID2 ), and the delegator has its own private key d ID2 = (r ID2 , h ID2 ). By using these values they can collude and obtain the private key of the delegatee, as follows:
ID1↔ID2 ) = (r ID2 / (r ID2 /r ID1 )) = r ID1
Thus, they can obtain (r ID1 , h ID1 ) = d ID1 . Using this, they can now produce signatures from the delegatee on any message.
In the second case, let us assume that the delegator (ID 2 ) is honest, and that the proxy and the delegatee (ID 1 ) are colluding. By performing the reverse of the steps given above, the proxy and delegatee will be able to jointly obtain the delegator's private key and use it to produce signatures on any message.
V. THE PROPOSED ID-BASED PROXY RE-SIGNATURE SCHEME
The new unidirectional Identity based proxy re-signature scheme, between a delegatee having identity A and delegator having identity B, is described below. It ensures that delegator and delegatee security are provided by inducing randomness in the proxy's rekey value.
Setup:
Let G 1 and G 2 be cyclic additive and multiplicative groups respectively having the same prime order p, and e be a cryptographic bilinear map: On input the private keys S A , S B of the delegatee and delegator respectively, having identities A and B, the resignature key for the proxy is computed in an interactive fashion as follows:
• The delegatee generates the signature as follows, using his private key:
• 
VI. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
The proposed scheme is computationally more efficient than the scheme in [3] . The expensive computations required in Hu's scheme are:
• Bilinear pairings: 4 • Point exponents: 10 • Point multiplication/division: 11 The new scheme requires the following expensive computations:
• Bilinear pairings: 2 • Point multiplication: 6
• Point addition/subtraction: 4 • Hash Computations: 4 As can be seen, the proposed scheme is computationally less intensive than Hu's existing scheme, while ensuring a higher degree of security.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Correctness
This proof is provided by proving the validity of the verification algorithm.
L.H.S= e (σ 11 , P) =e (σ 1 + H 2 (m) ·R 1, P) =e (H 2 (m) ·S A + R+ H 2 (m) · (S B + (r-1) S A ), P) =e (H 2 (m) · (S B + rS A ) +R, P) =e (H 2 (m) · (Q B + rQ A ), P pub ).e(R, P) =e (H 2 (m) · (Q B +σ 13 ), P pub )· σ 12 = R.H.S B. Unforgeability
As per the security notions, the proxy signature should not be susceptible to forgery in three scenarios: Limited Proxy:
When both the delegator and delegate are honest, the proxy only knows the rekey values, i.e.:
R 1 = S B + (r-1) S A and R 2 = r·Q A Given these, obtaining the private keys of A and B can be reduced to the discrete log problem.
Let us also assume that the proxy has access to a number of messages and valid signatures by A on those messages. In that case, producing a valid signature on a new message m* can trivially be reduced to the CDH hard problem. The inputs to the adversary will be <P, ap=Q A and bP=P pub >, and the output should be a part of the signature, i.e. it must include A's private key. <abP = S A >.
Delegator and Delegatee Security:
These two cases are similar to the limited proxy notion. The only difference here will be the added value of one private key. However, since there is an added random value as part of the proxy's re-key, it becomes impossible for dishonest colluders to obtain the private key of the honest party. This problem can again be reduced to the discrete log problem.
The unforgeabilty of the signature of the delegate can be shown in the same way as described above. In case of delegator security, the CDH problem inputs are altered to <P, ap = Q B and bP=P pub >, with output <abP=S B >.
VIII. INTER-DOMAIN APPLICATIONS
In an inter-domain application, there exist two KGCs each maintaining an independent identity based system. The delegatee (A) is managed by KGC1 and the delegator (B) by KGC2. The following changes are to be made to the described proxy re-signature: Setup:
The same algorithm described in section V. is used by each of the KGCs. Their generators are P 1 , P 2 respectively. Their corresponding master secret and master public values are s 1 , s 2 and P pub1 = s 1 For any user with identity ID, each KGC computes the public and private keys using their respective secret values.
Re-Key Gen:
On input the private keys S A , S B of the delegatee and delegator respectively, having identities A and B, the resignature key for the proxy is computed in an interactive fashion as follows:
• Randomly choose some r Є Z q
are given to the proxy Signature by Delegatee A:
The delegatee generates the signature as follows, using his private key:
• Randomly chooses some R Є Z q And, e (σ 41 ,P2) = e(P1,Ppub2)
IX. CONCLUSION
Thus, an attack on Hu et al's scheme is described, and a new ID Based Proxy Re-signature scheme is proposed, which is not susceptible to this attack. In terms of efficiency, this scheme is efficient, as it requires only two of the computationally expensive bilinear pairings, in comparison to the four pairing computations required in Hu et al's [5] scheme. The application of a modified version of this scheme can be used to ensure inter-domain security, as detailed. Inter-domain security has enormous potential in real-world applications, and the signature is one of the first attempts made to cater to this field. ACKNOWLEDGMENT I thank Dr. N.Vijayarangan, Senior Scientist of Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) Ltd, for encouraging me to work in the fields of Digital signatures and Inter-domain security. I am supported by them for exploring the applications of this research.
